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1  Introduction 
 
Competitive sealed-bid auctions are commonly used in the construction industry. Its 
basic rules are that all the qualified tenderers should quoted price sealed, bids must be 
submitted by a fixed deadline and opened publicly, and finally the lowest-price or 
second lowest-price tenderer will win the bid. Previous studies suggest the object for 
sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements (e.g., Goeree 
and Offerman [1] [2], Klemperer [3], and Laffont [4]). In contrast, Dyer and Kagel [5] 
argued construction contract bidding was usually treated as a common value auction. 
What makes the auction interesting is that bidders have different estimates of the true 
value at the time they bid. If bids decrease with decreasing cost estimates, the low 
bidder faces an adverse selection problem, as he/she wins only when he or she has one 
of the lowest estimates of the cost of construction. Unless this adverse selection 
problem is accounted for in bidding, the low bidder is likely to suffer from a ‘winner’s 
curse’, winning the item but making below normal or even negative profits. For 
competitive bidding auction, Klemperer [6] also investigates the vulnerability of 
auction mechanism to collusion, and shows the collusion is very likely to deter entry 
into an auction. Further, Caillaud and Jehiel [7] point out that collusion among buyers 
eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries in standard 
auctions. Although the bid auction theories rooted from market-based economy 
receive wide attentions, the market still shows the worries and qualms for bidders take 
aleatory behavior to make the enforcement of contract delayed in transition countries. 
  2For example, in recent years, some tenderers utilize the deficiency of law and 
regulation from government and try to seek profit for themselves by unwarrantable 
action after they win the bid in Chinese construction market. As a result, some 
perilous buildings and bridges constructed threaten against the public security. 
Because conventional bid auction theory is constructed in market-developed countries 
and some transition countries from plan to market economy have no perfect market 
and price mechanism, these theories and methods cannot fit the situation in transition 
countries. Thus, a problem researchers face is that if a general model can be 
constructed to cover different behavioral paradigms. This study generalizes 
competitive sealed-bid auction theory to allow for different risk preferences in bids. 
Since economic research on auction and competitive bidding began in 1961 with 
Vickrey’s [8] seminal work, most of the early auction literature follows the standard 
bid auction model from McAfee and McMillan’s [9] insight into bid auction theory 
(e.g., Rothkopf [10], Wilson [11], Milgrom [12], Maskin and Riley [13] [14]). 
Numerous models are almost based on the following several common assumptions: 
(A1) All tenderers are risk-neutral, (A2) Every tenderer has the independent 
information of estimating the bid, (A3) Payment is just the function of price quoted, 
(A4) The distribution of tenderers’ price quoted is symmetric. In previous effort, 
McAfee and McMillan [11] generalize auction theory, based on the results shown on 
optimal auctions with risk-averse bidders of Maskin and Riley [15], Matthews [16,17], 
Moore [18], Harstad, Levin and Kagel [19], to allow for uncertainty about the number 
for bidders (hereafter numbers uncertainty). They found in a first-price sealed-bid 
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bidders have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), then the expected revenue to 
the seller is greater if the actual number of bidders is concealed rather than revealed. 
Matthews [20] extends McAfee and McMillian’s result to the case in which buyers 
have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), and suggests that if bidders are risk 
neutral, the expected revenue to the seller is the same whether the actual number of 
bidders is revealed or concealed. However, the bidders prefer a policy of revelation 
when they have decreasing absolute risk aversion, and a policy of concealment when 
they have increasing absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, Matthews shows that some 
of the results change when the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion is 
relaxed. Eso and White [21] find precautionary bidding behavior can make DARA 
bidders perfect bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one 
when risk-neutral or CARA bidders would be indifferent. Waehrer, Harstad and 
Rothkopf [22] analyze the preferences of a risk-averse seller over the class of 
“standard” auctions with symmetric and risk-neutral bidders. The results suggest that 
all risk-averse sellers prefer a sealed-bid first-price auction with an appropriately set 
reserve price to any other standard auction. Delatas and Engelbrecht-Wiggans [23] 
consider a common value auction in which a "naive" bidder (who ignores the winner's 
curse) competes against a fully rational bidder. They show that the naive bidder earns 
higher equilibrium profits than the rational bidder when the signal distribution is 
symmetric and unimodal. 
Although the standard bid auction model offers an advantage for bid theory 
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consistent with reality and limited in use. In existing literature, scholars mainly deal 
with the bid behavior and strategy in situation of tender with unchanged risk-taking 
preferences: risk-neutral or risk- averse, lacking of the research of bid behavior and 
strategy with three different kinds of risk-taking tenderers exist at one time. As Smith 
and Levin [24] argue, although previous papers have considered the implications of 
endogenous entry by risk-neutral bidders (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans [25], Hausch and 
Li [26], Levin and Smith [27], Maskin and Riley [28], Samuelson [29]), the 
sensitivity of results to risk preferences has not been examined. Our surveys on bid 
behavior showed that in Chinese bidding market, all these three kinds of risk-taking 
preferences exist at the same time. The researches of west scholars based on the 
developed market economy and consummate law system, they cannot meet the needs 
of practices when these models are applied to bid auction in transition countries. As 
Rothkopf and Harstad [30] argued, sophisticated bidders in many auction markets 
profess to have little use for bidding theory. Design issues and objectives, as well as 
behavioral assumptions, tend to segregate most theoretical contributions in the 
literature from usefulness to practitioners. For example, a behavioral assumption that 
underlying probability distributions generating bidders’ information are commonly 
known is ubiquitous in the literature and often untenable in practice. In our study, 
these assumptions are relaxed to cover different three risk preferences mentioned 
above and further a general bid auction model is gained.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the estimate 
  5made in bid. Section 3 presents the general model with different risk preferences. 
Section 4 investigates the implications of extended bid auction model for competitive 
sealed-bid auction theory and practice and section 5 concludes.   
 
2 Price Estimate with Different Risk Preferences   
Engelbrecht-Wiggans [31] argues that different players have different utility functions. 
More often, the true characteristics of an object are not known. Different players may 
observe different information and form different estimates of the object’s true value. 
Consider a tender auction where n  qualified tenderers compete for a single 
construction object such as a public installations contract, drilling rights for oil etc. 
On account of different estimated cost for different tenderers, the tenderer i’s 
valuation of the object is denoted by  . We assume symmetric tenderers, where each 
tenderer’s private value is represented by an independent identically draw from the 
same distribution of private values, denoted by distribute function F on interval 
,  ,   is private value for the 
object known only to the tenderer i. Following McAfee & McMillan’s view [9], the 
tenderers are assumed to be risk-neutral, so the estimated cost    is not influenced by 
uncertain factors. This assumption is not completely identical with the reality. 
Samuelson [32] argues that uncertainty factors tenderers encounter always concern 
the cost of the object. In the real construction tendering project, the tenderers with 
different risk-taking preferences compete for a construction object at one-shot bid 
auction time. If the tendering auction contract is the total price contract, except the 
ci
] , [ c c h l ) , , 3 , 2 , 1 ( } max{ }, min{ n i c c c c i h i l L = = = ci
ci
  6certain factors for the cost price, the uncertain factors should also be taken into 
account.  
Actually, the governments of Britain and U.S. ask the tenderers to consider the 
effects of uncertain factors when quoting the price. Risk brought by the uncertain 
factors in construction object may result in different outcomes. Risk is characterized 
by impersonality, but there exist differences among the tenderers’ risk valuations. As 
the attitude to the uncertain factor depends on the tenderer’s risk-taking preferences, 
McAfee and McMillan [33] point out that in any specific bidding environment, the 
model builder for bid auction should pay attention to tenderers’ risk-taking 
preferences.  
The tenderer i’s estimation for uncertain factors of the construction is denoted by 
i c . The property of 
i c  and the degree that 
i c  influences the valuation  , 
depend on that tenderer’s risk preferences. With different tendering behavior and 
strategy, for risk-averse tenderers, it’s possible that 
ci
i c  is considered to be more 
latent cost than the latent profit and increase the quote price. Conversely, risk-seeking 
tenderers consider 
i c  to be more latent profit than the latent cost and decrease the 
quote price while the risk-neutral tenderers consider the probability of 
i c  for  latent 
profit is same to the probability of 
i c   for latent cost and valuations are not affected 
by 
i c . Thus, the valuation   is made up of three parts: first is   affected by 
positive 
ci ci
i c , second is   affected by negative  ci i c  and third is   not affected by  ci
i c . Thus, the tenderee’s payment to the winning tenderer i for the construction object 
can be given by 
  7i p = + i c δ
i c                     ( 1 )  
Where  i p  denotes the tenderer i’s payment,  ] 1 , 1 [− ∈ δ , represents the tenderer i’s 
risk-taking preference index with three cases, 
(i) [1 , 0 ) δ ∈− , δ presents risk-seeking tenderer’s degree of seeking risk. 
(ii) (0,1] δ ∈ ,δ presents risk- averse tenderer’s degree of avoiding risk. 
(iii) 0 = δ   means the tenderer is risk-neutral. 
 
3 Equilibrium Strategies and Revenues 
In extended standard bid auction model, the assumption “A1. tenderers are 
risk-neutral” would be change into “
1 A′ . tenderers have different risk-taking 
preferences”. That means all three kinds of risk-taking preferences tenderers compete 
for the construction contract. In this study, other three assumptions A2, A3, A4 still 
remain unchanged and hold out for all the tenderers when the tenderee is considered 
to be risk-neutral.   
For a construction project, tenderee will hope the price of the contract as low as 
possible because the tenderee’s payment for construction object should be reclaimed 
by contract with the project being finished. Otherwise, tenderee will lose out on the 
construction project. 
Lemma 1. For tenderer i’s quote price  , the n-tuple of strategies 
(
bi
() , () , , () B BB ⋅⋅ K ⋅ ), where   
()
i i B p b =                   ( 2 )  
is a Nash-equilibrium of the competitive sealed-bid auction.   
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Proof. If the tenderer i wins the contract with the quote price  , the price  bi
C
P  of 
the contract is given by 
                       
C
P =                    ( 3 )   bi
 
Assume tenderer i speculates that other tenderer j’s function of quote price is strictly 
increase with his cost. Thus, there exists a function B of quote price for tenderer i such 
that 
                        () i i B p b =                 ( 4 )  
Following Maskin and Riley’s view[13][14], the symmetry Nash-equilibrium exists 
under the condition.   
According to Lemma 1, we derive the equilibrium tendering functions for our 
model. Milgrom and Weber [34] characterize the equilibrium for standard auctions 
when bids are based on a univariate statistic. The explicit characteristic of the 
equilibrium allows us to study interesting economic phenomena such as the effects of 
uncertainty, public release of information and competition on efficiency and revenues 
(see, Goeree and Offerman [1]). We can assume the set of other tenderer’s tendering 
strategies (except the tenderer i) to be   
12 1 1 { ( ), ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( )}
ii BB B B B B
n p pp p p
−+ =     ( 5 )  
 
Theorem 1. Given  () B ⋅   is a strictly increasing function, the tenderer i’s valuation   
of the object is independent identically drawn from the same distribution of private 
ci
  9values, denoted by distribute function F on interval  , 
. If tenderers are symmetric, then the 
relationship among quote price, risk preference index and tenderer i’s valuation can be 
represented by  
] , [ c c h l





cc bc c δ
− −
=+ +      (6) 
 
Proof. Given  () B ⋅   is a strictly increasing function, the probability 
i p of tenderer i 
quoting the lowest price can be given by 
( () ) j i i prob b B p p = < (j=1,2,…i-1,i+1,…,n)                 (7) 
For  , where  is the inverse function of B, the probability of tenderer i 
winning the bid is equal to the probability of other (n-1) tenderers j lost the bid. So the 
maximum profit that the tenderer i expects with the quote price   will be 
. 








By equation (1) and lemma 1, we can obtain 
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To maximize , equation (8) should satisfy the first-order necessary condition,  ( )
i EΠ
  10i.e.,  
1 11 [ 1 ( ( ) ) ] ( ) ( 1 )( ( ) ) ( )0
i
ii i i i i
i
E
Fn F B bb c c b b BB
b
π δ
− −− ∂ ′′ =− − −− − =
∂
(9) 
For B(.) satisfied the symmetric Nash-equilibrium condition (according to lemma 1.), 
every rival of tenderer i is as sensible as tenderer i and anyone who estimate the same 
price quote the same price. Thus, we can obtain             
1 () ( ) , () ii i i i BB p bc c b c B i i i p c δ δ
− == + = = +               ( 1 0 )  
While substituting equation (10) in equation (8), we get: 
[1 ( )] ( )( 1) ( )
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Putting equation (12) in equation (11) gives 
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      ( 1 4 )                   
In equation (14), for n=1,   is equal to  , from the boundary condition we can 
get
bi ch




















       ( 1 5 )  
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The earliest bidding models (see 
Friedman [35]) assumed or calculated a probability distribution, F(x), for the best 
competitive bid, x, and then had the bidder choose the bid, b, that maximized his 
expected profit, (v-b)F(b), relative to a known expected value, v, for the auctioned 
asset. But here an extended bidding model consider the tenderers’ risk preferences. 
Although the number of tenderers increasing results in lowering of tenderers’ quote 
price for construction object, the differences among risk preference indexes make the 
degree of lowering of quote price distinct. To investigate the distinction, we analyze 
  12the characteristics of equation (15) in next section. 
 
4  Discussion 
The tenderer i who quotes the lowest price b i will win the bid in the lowest-price 
sealed construction tender. This extended model is efficient for it is characterized by 
rational tendering. Tenderer i who wins the bid quote the price for the maximum profit. 
If the tenderer doesn’t take part in the tendering, his profit will be zero. Otherwise, 
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We will analyze the effect of different risk preferences on quote price. In equation 
(15),  ] 1 , 1 [− ∈ δ   presents the tenderer i’s risk-taking preference index, i.e., the degree 
of seeking risk or avoiding risk.   
First, if the tenderer i  is risk-neutral, then  0 = δ . We can get the quote price 
according to (16): 
n




+ =              ( 1 7 )   
It is nearly identical to the standard bid auction model.   
Second, if the tenderer i  is risk-seeking, then  [1 , 0 ) δ ∈ − .  When  1 δ →− ,  it 
suggests that tenderers will lower their quote price avariciously so as to win the 
construction contract. According to equation (15), we can get the quote price: 



















            ( 1 8 )  
With other parameters unchanged, the risk-seeking tenderer will decrease the quote 
price    through increasing the degree of seeking risk δ.  bi
Third, if the tenderer i is risk-averse, then  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ . When  1 δ → ,  tenderers 
tend to quote the price scrupulously. Because of the asymmetric information, the 
tenderers hope to win the bid on one hand but increase the quote price for considering 




























               ( 1 9 )  
With other parameters unchanged, the risk-averse tenderers will increase the quote 
price    through increasing the degree of avoiding risk δ.  bi
Analysis above shows that risk-seeking tenderers are more likely to win the 
construction contract in one-shot construction tender auction.  But in real-world 
construction bid auction, selecting a risk-seeking tenderer will increase the latent risk 
of the risk-neutral tanderee than that of selecting other kinds of tenderers. If the 
risk-seeking tenderer who wins the bid, fails to fulfill the contract and cannot 
compensate for the loss brought by fell back or has any lawsuit entanglement with the 
tanderee, it’s possible that the actual loss of construction contract failure is taken by 
the tenderee. This is an acute failure transition countries encounter in practical 
construction bid auction. Both government and tenderee worry about the contract 
  14failure caused by low price competition for the construction object. A further research, 
on tendering model for different risk-taking preference with changing environment, 
should be made to find a new efficient mechanism and design on construction bidding, 




This study analyzes the effect of different risk-taking preferences on quoting the 
price. We assume that risk-averse tenderers would consider the probability of 
uncertain factors to be latent cost is bigger than the probability of it to be latent profit, 
and the risk-seeking tenderers would consider probability of uncertain factor to be 
latent profit is bigger than the probability of it to be latent cost while the risk-neutral 
tenderers would consider the probability of uncertain factor to be latent profit is same 
to the probability of it to be latent cost.. Based on these assumptions, this paper gives 
a tender model in lowest-price sealed bid auction for different risk-takings tenderers 
in construction industry. The results suggest that in a lowest-price sealed bid, 
risk-averse tenderers will quote a higher price, and risk-seeking tenderers will quote a 
lower price when risk-neutral tenderers will quote a middle price. However, the 
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